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ORGANIZATION ISSUES MONEY/POLITICS NEWS INDEX |
The impact of the 1995 Ohio campaign finance reforms:
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Dr. John C. Green, Director February 16, 2000 Executive Summary The impact of the 1995 Ohio campaign finance reforms is assessed by comparing the pattern of donations and donors in 1998 and 1994. Overall, the 1995 reforms changed the pattern of donations, reducing the size of donations, dispersing donations to more candidates, and channeling more donations through state party committees. However, these changes did not markedly alter the level of electoral competition, the underlying sources of funds, nor the distribution of donors. Acknowledgements The author would like to acknowledge the Citizens Policy Center and Laura Yeomans for the access to the 1994, 1996, and 1998 Ohio campaign finance databases and for assistance throughout this project; and the Joyce Foundation for financial support. Summary of Findings This report assesses the impact of the 1995 Ohio campaign finance reforms on the patterns of donations and donors in the 1998 election, using the 1994 election as a baseline. Overall, the 1995 reforms changed the pattern of donations, reducing the size of donations, dispersing donations to more candidates, and channeling more donations through state party committees. However, these changes did not markedly alter the level of electoral competition, the underlying sources of funds, nor the distribution of donors. The principal findings of the study are as follows:
Background: The 1995 Ohio Campaign Finance Reforms After a decade of intense debate, including the threat of a state-level ballot initiative, the Ohio legislature passed a major campaign finance reform law in 1995. Despite many detractors, this legislation constituted a significant advance in the regulation of campaign money in Ohio. The 1995 Ohio campaign finance reforms included a mix of standard and unusual features compared to other states. Among the standard features were the imposition of contribution limits (Ohio had essentially no contribution limits prior to 1995). The new contribution limits were as follows:
Chief among the unusual features of the 1995 Ohio reforms were special rules for campaign spending by party committees, as follows:
In sum, the 1995 Ohio campaign finance reforms set limits on the size of donations from individuals, PACs, and campaign committees to candidates for statewide and legislative offices. The reforms set higher contribution limits for the major state party organizations. State party committees were allowed to make larger donations to candidates than individuals, PACs, or campaign committees, including unlimited in-kind expenditures on behalf of candidates. The impact of the 1995 reforms will be assessed by comparing the pattern donations and donors in 1994 to 1998. Data and Methods This report is based on an analysis of databases for the 1994, 1996 and 1998 elections assembled by the Citizens Policy Center, under the direction of Laura Yeomans (see www.ohiocitizen.org for more information). These databases contain all the contributions (including in-kind) reported in the official campaign finance reports filed with the Ohio Secretary of State by statewide and legislative candidates and state-level party committees. The Citizens Policy Center enhanced the official records by identifying individual donors, coding individual and organizational donors by economic sector where possible, and adding information on candidates. These databases and associated reports provide a wealth of detailed information on Ohio campaign finance just before and just after the 1995 campaign finance reforms were enacted, and were thus ideal for assessing the impact of the 1995 reforms. However, all analyses and conclusions reported here are the responsibility of author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Citizens Policy Center. Data Adjustments. Two adjustments were made to the 1994 database to render it as comparable as possible to the 1998 database. First, because the 1994 database did not include funds raised in 1993, and the 1998 database included funds raised in both 1997 and 1998, the 1994 donations were weighted to reflect the aggregate funds raised in 1993. In addition, 1994 donations to state senate candidates were weighted to reflect the aggregate funds raised by incumbents not seeking re-election; such candidates were not included in the 1994 database but were part of the 1998 database. (The weighting was based on aggregate data provided by the Ohio Secretary of State). Second, to control for the effects of inflation, the 1994 dollar amounts were converted into 1998 constant dollars (using the Consumer Price Index). The analysis was limited to the same kinds of political entities in 1998 and 1994: major party candidates for the offices of governor, other statewide executive officers (attorney general, auditor, secretary of state, and treasurer), state legislative candidates (state senate and house), and state-level major party committees (the state party and legislative caucus committees). Party funds include in-kind expenditures on behalf of candidates. Forms of Analysis. To assess the impact of the 1995 reforms, the databases were analyzed in two ways: 1) by comparing profiles of donations and donors in 1998 and 1994; and 2) by reviewing the pattern of giving by repeat donors (who gave in both 1998 and 1994). Each of these kinds of analyses have their limitations. On the first count, many things changed between 1998 and 1994 besides the Ohio campaign finance laws, so differences in campaign finance observed between 1998 and 1994 may be due to factors other than the 1995 reforms. For instance, the 1998 gubernatorial election was much more competitive than the 1994 campaign. On the second count, identifying specific donors within a database was difficult because of variations in names and addresses, and this difficulty was compounded when the two databases were merged to matched individual donors. Thanks to the excellent work of the Citizens Policy Center these problems were minimized. For ease of presentation, Republican and Democratic candidates and committees are not separated in the analyses reported below. Overall, there were relatively few differences between the parties and their candidates in terms of the impact of the campaign finance laws. However, it is important to note that between 1994 and 1998 the Republican Party and its candidates generally raised more money than their Democratic counterparts. This trend began before the 1995 reforms and the operation of the reforms did not appear to have affected the trend. The Republican advantage appears to have more to do with prospects of controlling state government than the operation of the campaign finance reforms per se. Indeed, Democrats appear to have enjoyed a similar advantage in the late 1980s and early 1990s when they were likely to control state government offices. Data Tables. The bulk of the analysis is presented in eight tables profiling donations and donors in 1998 and 1994. The categories in these tables are defined as follows. For both donations and donors, the tables list four sources of funds: individuals, political action committees (PACs) (partnerships and other associations were treated as PACs, even though they are not required to form PACs by law), campaign committees (including candidates' personal donations to their own campaigns as well as donations of campaign and personal funds to other candidates and committees), and party committees (state, legislative caucus, and other major party committees). (Judicial and state school board candidates were excluded.) Within each of these four sources of funds, donations were categorized by size: $200 or less (which will be labeled "small" donations for ease of presentation); $201 to $1,000 and $1,000 to $2,500 (labeled "middle-size" donations); $2,501 to $5,000 and Over $5,000 (labeled "large" donations.) These categories reflect common divisions in federal and Ohio campaign finance laws. For instance, $200 is the threshold for reporting the name, address and occupation of federal donors (the Ohio threshold is $25 dollars), and $1,000 is the maximum individual contribution to a federal candidate in an election. The $2,500 figure is the maximum individual, PAC or campaign committee contribution to an Ohio candidate in an election; $5,000 is the legal maximum from such sources if a candidate faces a primary and a general election, and for donations to PACs and legislative caucus committees. For donors, the Over $5,000 category was broken into four further categories: $5,001 to $10,000; $10,001 to $25,000; $25,001 to $50,000; and Over $50,000. The $25,000 figure is the legal maximum any individual may give to federal candidates in aggregate; no such aggregate limit exists in Ohio. Many of the tables report two sets of figures for 1998 and 1994 (see Table 1 for reference). The first set is labeled "number of donations" (or donors), and represents the percentage of donations (or donors) in each size category; these figures add to a subtotal by source of funds (in bold); both sets of figures sum separately to 100 percent of the total number of donations (or donors). The second set of figures is labeled "amount of funds," and represents the percentage of total money raised from these same categories, which subtotal and total to 100 percent of all money raised in an analogous fashion. In some tables, each column is followed by a column entitled "Change 98-94" which includes a "+" for increases, a "-" for decreases, and a " " when no change occurred. Both the number of donations (or donors) and the amount of funds in the tables are expressed as percentages so as to assess the relative importance of the sources of funds. The absolute number of donations or donors and the amount of funds on which the tables are based is given in the text. Adjusting for Unitemized Small Donations. One additional adjustment was made to these data. The 1998 and 1994 databases include entries for aggregated individual donations of less than $25 (which Ohio law does not require to be itemized). All such entries were categorized as $200 or less regardless of their actual size and appear as such in the "amount of funds" columns. Adjusting the number of donations or donors columns was more problematic. We estimated the number by assuming that the average size of the donation was $12.5 (one-half of the reporting threshold of $25) and that each donation came from a single donor; the resulting figures (9,750 in 1998 and 12,400 in 1994) were added to the "number of donations" (and donors) in the tables. Donations to Candidates, 1998 and 1994 Since the 1995 Ohio campaign finance reforms set limits on the size of donations to candidates, we begin by comparing the pattern of such donations in 1998 and 1994. Table 1 profiles the distribution of donations for all candidates (governor, other state-wide, and state legislative) in both elections. The absolute number of donations to candidates increased from an estimated 132,000 in 1994 to 147,000 in 1998; the amount of funds also increased from $38 million in 1994 to $53 million in 1998 (in 1998 constant dollars). Thus, the 1995 reforms did not prevent an increase in the number of donations or the amount of funds raised. It is important to note, however, that the principal reason for the increase in funds raised was the competitiveness of the 1998 gubernatorial campaign. The largest source of donations in both years was from individuals, who accounted for more than four-fifths of donations in 1998 and 1994 (first set of columns in Table 1). Most individual donations were $200 or less, accounting for a little less than two-thirds of all donations in 1998 and almost three-quarters in 1994. Thus, Ohio campaign finance is and was characterized by a very large number of small individual donations. Between 1994 and 1998, the proportion of large individual donations ($2,501 or more and Over $5,000) declined. In fact, there would not have been any 1998 donations in the largest category if it had not been for a largely self-financed candidate in the 1998 Democratic gubernatorial primary (Bruce Douglas), thus allowing his rival (Lee Fisher) to accept donations in large amounts. (The Fisher campaign returned a portion of these large donations when Douglas withdrew from the race; we include them here to show the effects of this provision of the law.) This decline in the largest individual donations appear to be the direct result of the 1995 reforms. Note, however, that the proportion of small donations declined between 1998 and 1994. This decline in the relative importance of smallest donations was surely not an intention of the 1995 reforms. The relative decline in small individual donations was accompanied by an increase in the proportion of middle-sized individual donations ($201-$1,000 and $1,000-$2,500 categories), which was probably a goal of the 1995 reforms. Between 1998 and 1994, there was also an increase in the proportion of donations from PACs, rising from a little over one-tenth in 1994 to one-sixth of all donations in 1998. A much smaller increase also occurred for donations from campaign committees, which accounted for less than 2% of all donations in both years. In both cases, increases occurred in the small and middle-size categories and declines took place in the large categories. In contrast, party donations showed a slight decline in relative importance between 1994 and 1998, and also accounted for less than 2 percent of all donations in both years. What about the amount of funds raised from these categories of donations? The second set of columns in Table 1 addresses this question by reporting the amount of funds from various sources. Here, too, individuals were the principal source of funds, accounting for just over one-half of all funds raised in 1998 and just under one-half in 1994. The patterns here resemble the patterns for the number of donations. Note, for example, the decline of large donations (for example in the Over $5,000 category, from 8.8 percent funds in 1994 to 1.5 percent in 1998). But also note that the proportion of funds raised from small donations declined as well. Meanwhile, there were substantial increases in the middle-sized donation categories (for example for the $201-$1,000 category, from 13.4 percent in 1994 to 20.7 percent of all funds in 1998). Overall, the relative importance of PAC funds increased slightly, with PACs accounting for less than one-fifth of all funds in both years. The proportion of funds raised from the largest donation categories declined and all other categories increased, especially the middle-sized donations. In contrast, the proportion of funds raised from campaign committees remained constant, at about one-twentieth of all funds raised. There was a decline in the largest category of donations, and this decline would have been greater except for the large donations of Democratic primary candidate Bruce Douglas to his own campaign. Campaign committees experienced increases from middle-size donations as well. The funds raised from party donations declined from a little more than one-quarter of all funds in 1994 to a little less than one-quarter in 1998. This change arose from changes in legislative caucus spending, especially for the Democrats and due to the retirement of legendary Speaker Vernal Riffe. In fact, party donations actually rose in the highly competitive gubernatorial and other statewide races in 1998. Parties suffered declines in most of the categories of donations. Thus, party committees were barely able to keep their relative place as a source of campaign funds of candidates in 1998, despite the special provisions in the 1995 reforms. Taken together, the patterns in Table 1 reveal three major changes in the pattern of donations to candidates between 1994 and 1998, from individuals, PAC, and campaign committees. First, the relative importance of the largest donations has declined. Second, the relative importance of the smallest category of donations declined as well. Third, there has been an increase in middle-sized individual and PAC donations. Thus, overall there was a "squeeze toward the middle" in donations and funds given to Ohio candidates in 1998. However, the distribution of party donations changed little. The figures in Table 1 are the aggregation of donations to several different types of campaigns, each with their own unique features. Indeed, some of the overall patterns in Table 1 arose because of the special circumstances of particular campaigns. As we have already noted, the persistence of donations over $5,000 was the product of the 1998 Democratic gubernatorial primary. Similarly, the decline in the relative proportion of small donations appears to have resulted largely from the 1998 gubernatorial campaigns, while the decline of party donations resulted in large measure from changes in state legislative caucus spending. Finally, the increase in the relative importance of PAC donations came mostly from an increase in middle-sized PAC donations to state legislative candidates. Donations to State Party Committees, 1998 and 1994 What happened to donations to state party committees, committees which were allowed to accept larger donations under the 1995 reforms? Table 2 presents information analogous to Table 1 for all state party committees (state party committees and legislative caucuses; public and building funds were excluded). The state parties had approximately 10,500 donations in 1994 and 13,000 in 1998; however, they raised approximately the same amount in both years, $22 million (in 1998 constant dollars). However, this constant figure masks some important shifts in party funds: some Democratic committees declined and some Republican committees increased by about the same amount. Individual donors accounted for most donations to state party committees, with small donations making up one-half of all donations in 1994 and 1998. State party committees also received a little less than one-fifth of their donations from PACs, and about one-sixth of their donations came from campaign and other party committees combined. The number of individual and PAC donations declined slightly from 1994 to 1998, while the number of campaign and party committee donations increased modestly. These changes were a more modest version of the changes experienced by candidates. However, there were some major shifts in the amounts of funds raised. Between 1998 and 1994, the relative amount of funds raised by individuals and PACs almost completely reversed themselves, with individual funds rising from 18.3 percent to 23.6 percent of all party funds, and PACs falling from 26.7 percent to 18.5. This reversal resulted largely from an increase in middle-sized individual donations and those $2,501 to $5,000, and a very sharp decline in funds coming from the largest PAC donations (19.4 to 7.5 percent). A very similar reversal occurred for candidates and parties: candidate funds fell from 31.1 percent in 1994 to 24.7 percent in 1998, while funds from other party committees rose from 23.6 percent in 1994 to 33.2 percent in 1998. This second reversal was fueled by both a decline of the largest category of campaign committee donations (28.3 to 20.7 percent) and a similar increase the largest category of donations from other party committees (21.0 to 29.5 percent). Some of this change appears to result directly from the 1995 reforms. PACs and campaign committees could no longer make donations in excess of the $15,000 per year to state party committees, and state party committees benefitted from large intra-party transfers from their local and national affiliates. Note, however, that there was actually a decline in the proportion of funds raised from the largest individual donations, and that increases in funds from individual donations came from donations of less than $5,000. Electoral Competition It is difficult to judge the impact of the 1995 reforms on electoral competition because of the stark differences between 1994 and 1998. In one way or another, Ohio elections were quite competitive in the 1990s. For example, the 1998 gubernatorial election was quite close and the 1994 legislative races involved a larger than normal turnover in legislative seats. It is unclear, however, that campaign finance regulations played an important role in these situations. After all, the 1998 gubernatorial elections was competitive mostly because of the absence of an incumbent governor seeking re-election and the competitiveness of legislative races in 1994 largely reflected the effects of the post-1990 redistricting. Overall, candidates who were already competitive were able to raise adequate funds under both pre-1995 and post-1995 campaign finance regulations. It is also clear, however, that the availability of funds to candidates depended on non-financial factors such as incumbency and redistricting. Indeed, the 1995 reforms did little to help candidates raise funds in sufficient quantities to overcome these obstacles. Thus, challenging candidates remained poorly funded. In 1994 and 1998, donations of all sizes from individuals, PACs, and campaign committees were biased toward incumbents. In contrast, party funds showed less of an incumbent bias. Within the context of incumbency and similar factors, the 1995 reforms did appear to have an effect on the sources of funds to candidates in different electoral circumstances. Table 3 looks at the total funds raised by state legislative candidates (senate and house) in 1998 and 1994. (For ease of presentation, the size categories have been left out of Table 3.) Table 3 divides all of the general election candidates into three categories: big win (winners by more than 60 percent of the two-party vote); close (winners and losers in races won by between 40 and 60 percent); and big loss (losers with less than 40 percent). As one might imagine, the big win category tended to contain safe incumbents, the close category open seats, and the big loss category challengers, although there are some exceptions to this pattern. In 1994, big win candidates raised $5.0 million in aggregate, which increased to $7.7 million in 1998; analogous figures for candidates in close races were $11.1 million in 1994 and $8.7 million in 1998; for big loss candidates, the figures were $1.3 million in 1994 and $.9 million in 1998. In 1998, candidates in the big win category raised almost two-fifths of their funds from individual donors, down slightly from 1994, partly because of a modest decline in funds from large donations and an increase in middle-size ones. In 1998, one-half of the funds in the big win category came from PACs, also fueled by the rise of middle-sized donations. Interestingly, campaign and party committee donations accounted for a little more than one-tenth of the funds raised in the big win category, down from 1994. In 1998, candidates in close races raised a less than one-quarter of their funds from individuals and nearly as much from PAC donations. These figures were markedly lower than for big win candidates. However, candidates in close elections experienced relative gains in both individual and PAC donations from 1994, most of which came in the form of middle-size donations. Campaign and party committees together account for more than one-half of the funds raised by candidates in close races, a sharp contrast to the big win category. Interestingly, campaign and party funds decreased in relative terms between 1994 and 1998. This change may be due in part to the new funds available from PACs and individual donors in 1998. Candidates in the big loss category raised more than one-quarter of their funds from individuals, more than for close race candidates, but markedly less than for big win candidates (who were by and large their opponents). However, individual funds declined in proportion for such candidates between 1994 and 1998. Big loss candidates also raised a smaller proportion of their funds from PACs--a little more than one-fifth of the total--also far less than big win candidates. However, these candidates experienced an increase in PAC donations as well, up from just one-tenth of the 1994 total. Campaign and party committees also provided more than one-half of the funds for the big loss candidates in both elections. Here campaign committee funds declined and party donations increased, but the total remained essentially the same between 1994 and 1998. The most striking finding in Table 3 is the importance of party donations to candidates in close races and to big loss candidates. These figures include donations to candidates as well as unlimited in-kind spending. Party committees were much less important to the funding of big win candidates, who relied much more on individual and especially PAC donations. However, all three kinds of candidates gained in middle-size PAC donations. This dispersal of PAC funds appears to be the result of the 1995 reforms. These patterns are especially important when one considers the impact of term limits, which take effect in the 2000 elections. The state party committees may well be the crucial funders of an increased number of competitive races in 2000 and thereafter. However, PACs and individual donors may also play an expanded role in funding such candidacies. Economic Sectors What impact did the 1995 reforms have on the relative importance of funds from economic sectors? Table 4 compares the percentage of funds provided to candidate and party committees by ten important economic sectors (plus ideological donors) in 1994 and 1998. These data must be viewed with some caution: they represent the proportion of funds in cases where an economic sector could be identified for the donor. Such identification was quite difficult; the Citizens Policy Center should be commended for their excellent work in identifying and coding economic sectors. The coded donation accounted for 47 percent of donations 1994 and 68 percent in 1998 (but 87 percent and 90 percent of the funds raised, respectively). The figures in Table 4 include both individual and PAC donations from the economic sectors because the patterns were very similar. Of the eleven economic sectors in Table 4, four experienced relative gains, one remained the same, and six experienced relative declines. The largest gain occurred for the finance sector (including finance, insurance and real estate), which allowed it to retain its top ranking from 1994. The proportion of funds supplied by lawyers and lobbyists also increased in relative terms between 1994 and 1998. Two major sectors lost ground, manufacturing and other business groups and organized labor. Relative gains were also posted by the communication and energy sectors, while relative losses occurred for health, construction, agriculture, and ideological donors. The proportion of funds from transportation remained unchanged. It is worth noting, however, that these relative gains and losses were quite modest and that the overall ranking of sectors changed little. This analysis suggests that the 1995 reforms had only a modest effect of the relative importance of economic sector funds in Ohio politics. Whatever ground PACs and individuals in these sectors may have lost by the 1995 contribution limits, they seem to have made up by giving more, smaller donations to a wider variety of candidates and committees. Patterns of Donors, 1998 and 1994 So far we have described the pattern of donations and the amount of funds raised. What about the donors who made such donations? Table 5 takes a looks at individual donors, reporting the aggregation of all of donations made by specific individuals to candidates and state party committees in 1998 and 1994. In a fashion analogous to Table 1, Table 5 first reports the relative number of donors and then the amount of funds raised from these donors. These data must be interpreted with some caution. Identifying individual donors can be quite difficult and these figures may over-estimate the number of donors by failing to combine individuals whose names and/or addresses were not listed consistently in official campaign reports. All told, we estimate some 65,000 individual donors in 1994, who contributed some $22 million, and some 77,000 donors in 1998, who gave $32 million. Small donors (giving $200 or less in aggregate) made up the bulk of individual givers in both 1998 and 1994. The relative proportion of small donors fell between 1994 and 1998 by about ten percentage points. Middle-size donors ($201-$1,000 and $1,000-$2,500) increased, as did larger donors, including those who gave up to $25,000. Only among the very largest donors (Over $50,000) was there a slight decline. Thus, there was a more modest "squeeze toward the middle" among donors as well. Despite limits on large donations in the 1995 reforms, the number of large donors actually increased between 1994 and 1998, except at the very highest level. It is worth noting, however, that donors who gave more than $5,000 in aggregate accounted for less than 2 percent of all donors both years. What about the amount of funds raised by these categories of donors? The proportion of funds supplied by small donors declined markedly between 1994 and 1998, from almost one-fifth of all funds contributed by individuals to just over one-tenth. A smaller decline also occurred in the first of the middle-size categories ($201-1,000), where the proportion declined from just over one-fourth in 1994 to just under one-fifth. Meanwhile, funds from all the other categories of donors increased, sometimes modestly, except for the very largest donors, who experienced a modest decline. By 1998, individuals who gave more than $5,000 in aggregate accounted for 35.8 percent of the funds raised from individuals, compared to 33.6 percent in 1994. Thus, while the 1995 reforms did reduce the proportion of the largest donations, the proportion of funds from large donors actually increased. In both years, roughly one-percent of the individual donors contributed about one-third of all funds raised from individuals. This same pattern held for PACs (data not shown). Between 1994 and 1998, the proportion of funds raised from small PACs (entities that gave less than $200 in aggregate) declined as did the proportion of funds raised from the largest PACs. Meanwhile, there was a growth in the proportion of funds raised from PACs in the middle-range. So that in 1998, 93 percent of PAC donations came from committees that gave more than $5,000 in aggregate, compared to 91 percent in 1994. Here, too, the 1995 reforms appear to have increased modestly the relative importance of large PACs. A more complex pattern occurred for campaign and party committees (data not shown). For campaign committees, there was an increase in small donations and a fairly dramatic drop in the proportion of funds given by the largest committees (from 77.2 percent of all funds in 1998 to 62.3 percent in 1994). Party committees showed modest increases at the low and high end of the spectrum. But in 1998, 95.3 percent of party funds were distributed by the largest committees, up from 91.3 percent in 1994. In sum, the 1995 reforms appear to be associated with a modest increase in the relative importance of large donors, among both individuals and organizations. Changes in Donor Behavior, 1998 and 1994 One way to assess the effects of the 1995 reforms is to analyze changes in the behavior of specific donors between 1994 and 1998. Accordingly, the 1994 and 1998 databases were merged and individual donors who gave in both 1994 and 1998 were matched. Similar merges were performed for 1994/1996 databases and the 1996/1998 databases. As with the identification of individual donors, the process of matching donors across databases was quite difficult and easily susceptible to error, thus the results must be interpreted with caution. The matching of the 1994 and 1998 database for individual donors revealed an important fact: there were relatively few repeat individual donors. Overall, just 25 percent of the individual donors in 1998 had also been donors in 1994 (firm matches). Similar matches of the 1994/1996 and 1996/1998 databases--which represent a two-year rather than a four-year time span--yielded slightly higher estimates of repeat donors. As a check on possible errors, all similar names were also counted as potential matches. This estimate suggests that the number of matches might be as high as 35 percent of the 1998 donors. This figure is an outside estimate and unlikely to be correct, given the methodology employed by the Citizens Policy Center to identify individual donors (which involved the use of names, addresses and zip codes). Careful inspection of the matched cases in 1994 and 1998 lends credence to the 25 to 35 percent figure. The non-repeat donors were heavily concentrated among small givers who made just one donation to one candidate. In contrast, repeat donors were concentrated among the largest donors, who gave many donations to numerous candidates and committees. In fact, the repeat donors accounted for the bulk of actual donations and funds donated. For example, the donors that constituted the firmest match between 1994 and 1998 provided 52 percent of the actual donations and 66 percent of the funds in 1998. These figures suggest two conclusions. First, the Ohio campaign finance system is characterized by a large number of small, occasion donors. These donors constitute a large portion of the participants in the finance system, and most have to be replaced in every election cycle. Indeed, the decline in the importance of funds from small donors reflects both the inability of candidates and committees to retain small donors, and perhaps a push for middle-size donations in 1998. Although individually these donations were quite small, they were significant in aggregate. For instance, the 1994 non-repeat donors who did not give in 1996 or 1998 were the source of some $15 million, which is about the size of PAC donations to candidates in 1998. Second, it is the repeat donors who are the major actors in the campaign finance system. Table 6 reports the mean number of donations for 1994-1998 repeat donors in 1994 and 1998, and compares them to new donors in 1998 and non-repeat ("old") donors from 1994. The donors are divided by the same categories as in Table 5. Not surprisingly, the mean number of donations increased from the smallest donors (2.1 donations in 1998) to the largest (30.0 donations in 1998). However, the differences between 1998 and 1994 for repeat donors is striking: the mean number of donations increases in every category of donors. The largest donors tripled the mean number of donations, from 10.7 to 30.0, while donors $5,000-$10,000 roughly doubled, from 4.1 to 9.4. The repeat donors also made more donations on average than the new 1998 donors in all categories. Similarly, the new 1998 donors usually made more donations on average than the old 1994 donors. Thus, the old 1994 donors were replaced by more active set of givers in 1998. It would appear that one response to the 1995 reforms was for donors to make more donations, and another response was for candidates and committees to recruit more active, new donors. These possibilities are generally supported by Table 7, which reports the mean donation size in 1994-1998 for repeat donors. Note, for example, that for middle-sized donors, the mean donation size increased between 1994 and 1998, and for the large donors, the mean size decreased, except for the largest donors, when the mean donation remained about the same. Interestingly, the mean size of donations also went down among the smallest donors. These data are the other side of the "squeeze toward the middle" noted above: large donors gave more and smaller donations, and middle-sized donors gave more and larger donations between 1994 and 1998. The new 1998 donors had smaller mean donations at all levels than the old 1994 donors. Interestingly, the mean donation of largest old 1994 donors was more than twice as large as the comparable figure for 1998 repeat donors. Who received these new donations? One possibility was state party committees, which were allowed to take large donations under the 1995 reforms. Table 8 reports the mean percentage of funds that were given to state party committees by repeat, new 1998, and old 1994 donors. In 1998, all the categories of repeat donors tended to give more to party committees than they had in 1994, with the most dramatic increases occurring among the largest donors. For example, the largest repeat donors gave 53.8 percent of their funds to state party committees, up from 37.8 percent in 1994. A very similar pattern obtained for new 1998 donors. The 1995 reforms appear to have achieved their objective of funneling large donations through the state party committees. Note, however, that the old 1994 donors also gave heavily to party committees, especially among the middle-sized donors. The state party committees appear to have lost a cadre of middle-sized donors even while they were gaining new donors and more funds from the larger categories of donors. It could be that in 1998 repeat donors also shifted donations to local party committees and PACs, which as we have seen, increased their aggregate donations to candidates and party committees in 1998. Unfortunately, the 1994 and 1998 databases do not contain reports of such donations. Some important changes also occurred in terms of the distribution of funds to candidates, but these reflect the competitiveness of campaigns. In 1994, individual donors of all sorts gave a relatively small percentage of their funds to the gubernatorial race (15 percent overall) and more to legislative races (55 percent). In 1998, more went to gubernatorial campaigns (22 percent) and less to legislative campaigns (45 percent). In all these data, there is evidence of the dispersal of the funds of the largest donors and an increase in the donations of middle-size donors. A very similar pattern occurred for PAC, campaign and party committees (data not shown). As with individuals, there was a relatively low level of repeat donors between 1994 and 1998, principally because of a large number of small committees that gave a single donation to a single candidate. For example, only about 25 percent of PACs were repeat donors between 1994 and 1998, but as one might expect, these were the largest and most important PACs. Between 1994 and 1998, these large committees also increased the number of donations. For example, the largest PACs (Over $50,000) make a mean of 190 donations in 1998, up from 106 in 1994. This increase allowed most large PACs to maintain or actually increase the amount of funds they supplied to the system. In the case of PAC and campaign committees, the mean size of a donation decreased, with an increase in middle-size donations. In contrast, the number and size of party donations was largely unchanged from 1994. In sum, repeat individual and organizational donors appear to have responded to the contribution limits in the 1995 reforms by giving more donations to a larger number of candidates and committees. The new 1998 donors recruited to replace the old 1994 donors also gave more donations to more candidates and committees. Thus, one result of the 1995 reforms was to increase the dispersion of funds donated, and another result was to recruit new, more active donors. The overall result was to leave the relative distribution of funds from individual and organizational donors largely unchanged.
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See text for definitions of categories * Less than .1 percent of totals
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See text for definitions of categories * Less than .1 percent of totals
Legend
Source: Citizen Policy Center, 1998 and 1994
Source: Citizens Policy Center, 1998 and 1994
Legend
Source: Citizens Policy Center
Source: Citizens Policy Center, 1998 and 1994
Source: Citizens Policy Center, 1998 and 1994
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