![]() |
| ||||||||||||
| » OR Search By Biz Name, Location | |||||
|
|
INSIDE News » The Plain Dealer » Newsflash » Weather » Traffic » Obituaries » Opinion » Business » Crime » Politics » Education
|
| ||||||||||||||||||||
News
Safety advisers question NRC about plants 12/06/02
Rockville, Md.- Some of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's top safety
advisers were sharply critical yesterday of FirstEnergy Corp. and the
agency itself for repeatedly failing to spot the years-long decline of
safety consciousness at the Davis-Besse nuclear plant. Members of the NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
questioned whether the agency's current approach to monitoring the
nation's 103 nuclear plants is adequate to catch the subtle erosion of
values among workers and bosses alike that inevitably leads to accidents.
"It's a major failure of the system, in my view, and we should all
contemplate this," George Apostolakis, the panel's chairman, said in an
interview. He stressed that he was not speaking for the advisory group, which will
submit its formal recommendations to the NRC's governing board this
spring. Apostolakis and fellow NRC adviser Stephen Rosen said they would like
to see the agency develop a way of measuring a nuclear plant's "safety
culture" - the attitudes that indicate how seriously they take maintaining
and operating the reactor. The regulatory system the NRC has followed since the late 1990s does
not directly evaluate a plant's safety culture, primarily because there is
not widespread agreement on how best to measure it and because the nuclear
industry has resisted what it sees as the government's attempt to
interfere in management issues. This year's incident at Davis-Besse, in which workers discovered a
long-festering rust hole on the reactor's lid that threatened a major
nuclear accident, has heightened the debate about regulating safety
culture. The NRC's 11-member reactor safety advisory committee, which serves as
a powerful independent voice on policy-making matters, spent more than two
hours quizzing NRC staff members about how the unprecedented rust hole
could have been allowed to grow unnoticed for at least four years. Panel member Graham Leitch noted Davis-Besse's reactor operators
weren't the ones deciding whether the plant was in condition to keep
running. Instead, they went along with engineering and maintenance workers
who judged it was OK to run with deteriorating equipment. "All of that is now observably changed," said Jack Grobe, who heads the
NRC's Davis-Besse oversight panel. "The longer-term barriers that must be
broken down are organizational . . . to make sure that [the operators] are
being supported." Arthur Howell, who chaired the agency's task force charged with
articulating the lessons to be learned from Davis-Besse, said the industry
and the NRC recognized the potential for a Davis-Besse-type development 10
years ago. But they underestimated the speed and conditions in which
corrosion could occur. The agency's staff failed to follow through on inspections for
corrosion, to learn from other countries' experience with lid cracks and
leaks and to recognize the warning signs appearing at Davis-Besse, he
said. "We didn't see any focused effort on the part of the NRC to identify
the leak source" at Davis-Besse, Howell said. The French government, which operates more than 70 reactors, recognized
the potential for lid cracking and corrosion as early as 1991. But unlike
its American counterpart, the French embarked on a program of
instrument-aided lid inspections and eventual replacement of all of its
reactor lids. "Did it never occur to anybody that the French were . . . years ahead
of us?" advisory panel member Peter Ford asked about the lid replacement
program. Howell answered that there was not widespread awareness in the NRC of
the French program and that some staffers considered it an overreaction.
Since Davis-Besse, several U.S. reactor operators have ordered new
lids, and the NRC is likely to require more stringent and more frequent
inspections. Howell's task force recommended 51 changes in NRC procedures and
policies to ensure that another incident like Davis-Besse's does not
occur. Those recommendations are now in the hands of NRC Executive
Director William Travers, who will send them to the agency's governing
board for action. To reach these Plain Dealer reporters: jmangels@plaind.com, 216-999-4842 jfunk@plaind.com, 216-999-4138
| ||||||||||||||||||||||
About Us | User Agreement | Privacy Policy | Help/Feedback | Advertise With Us © 2002 cleveland.com. All Rights Reserved. | ||||||||||||||||||||||